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Abstract 
Corroboration or Confirmation is a prominent philosophical debate of the 20th century. 
Many philosophers have been involved in this debate most notably the proponents of 
confirmation led by Hempel and its most powerful criticism – the falsification thesis of Popper. 
In both cases however the debates were primarily based on the arguments from logic. In this 
paper we review these debates and suggest that a different perspective on falsification versus 
confirmation can be taken by grounding arguments in cognitive psychology. 
Keywords: Falsification, Confirmation, Logic, Psychology 
Introduction 
The idea of scientific justification, a key concept of the philosophy of science, has been a 
common ground of intellectual battles of the 20th century. Among many others, corroboration 
advocated by Karl Popper and verification presented by Carl Hempel attempted to provide 
contrasting accounts of scientific progress. Using formal logic as a theoretical foundation, 
Hempel and Popper were concerned with both rationalizing as well as developing an optimum 
method of scientific discoveries. While both falsification and verification provide account of 
scientific reason, they contain a number of contradictions and ultimately fail to capture the full 
complexity of a scientific process. 
Both verification and falsification contain powerful arguments that support their models. 
Verification stems from human’s desire to quantify a probability of a similar event occurring 
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again in the same way. Ensuring this probability is a theory that is derived from a number of 
observations. Major proponent of verification, Hempel argued that each new confirmation 
strengthens the theory, and diversity of experimentation is important. Some theories cannot be 
tested directly, and bridge concepts become vital as they extend theoretical articulations into 
observable realm. Simplicity is what makes, according to Hempel, one theory better than 
another. 
From the logical point of view (as opposed to cognitive that is discussed later), 
verification fails due to a problem of induction that has been identified by Hume and later 
adopted by Popper. An induction moves from a statement of a narrow scope to a statement of a 
broader scope. In an inductive argument, conclusion always goes beyond the original premises: 
  H1. I observed a thousand crows, and they were black. 
  H2. Therefore, all crows are black. 
Pondering on the mechanisms of induction, Hume reasoned, inductive statements are 
impossible to justify. One can not apply deductive logic to it, and similarly, cannot use induction 
itself to prove it without inevitable circularity. As basic form of reasoning, Hume concludes, 
inductive statements cannot be justified (Harris 1997, p. 52). Adopting Hume’s conclusions, 
Popper, argued further that experiments can only produce a one to one statement, and cannot 
generalize – a process necessary for scientific advancement.  
Responding to verificationists that focused on experimentation, Karl Popper argued that 
fundamentally, science begins with problems and questions, and not with experiments (Popper 
2003, p. 222). Experimentations, he reasoned may occasionally give rise to theories, but only if 
they contradict, or “clash” with existing theoretical beliefs. Ultimately, he continued, science 
seeks solutions and understanding, and both can only be found in theories, not experiments. This 
reasoning suggested a deductive account of science. 
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In the domain of logical reasoning, verification contains an internal contradiction, which 
was exploited by Popper as one of the main justification behind an alternative deductive method. 
Popper noticed that from a logical perspective, verification is regressive. Hempel’s primary 
measurement of theory’s acceptability is the principle of simplicity. Assuming that “the basic 
laws of nature are simple” (Hempel 1966, p. 42), Hempel regarded simple theories as more 
probable. Popper, employing a basic premise of probability: probability of one is always more 
than probability of sums, noticed that on the basis of logic, one verification is probabilistically 
stronger than several. Thus, the core of verificationism that Hempel developed into concepts of 
“diversity of evidence” (p. 35) and confirmation by new evidence (p. 37) have been undermined.  
Simplicity of the verification theory also fails because it necessitates a need for simplicity 
measurement. As Hempel (1966) remarked “any criteria of simplicity would have to be 
objective,” but he then admitted that “it is not easy to state clear criteria of simplicity” (p. 41).  
Yet, such even if it achieves a maximum objectivity, itself will have to be a theory. Therefore, 
the principle of simplicity inevitably leads to a circular argument: one theory will be used to 
verify / measure another, ultimately producing an infinite logical loop.  
An alternative to verification according to Popper was falsification or corroboration of 
theories. The logic of scientific justification for Popper is a fundamentally deductive one. 
Theories are born as guesses and the role of science is to test them in order to reveal their 
falsities. The theories that withstand the tests become corroborated, while the ones that fail are 
called falsified. Failures, however, are important stepping stones of progress, as people learn 
from their own mistakes.  
Unlike induction that logically cannot offer truth, falsification is truth apt due to its 
deductive foundation. Yet, Popper realizes that universal truth is unattainable.  To overcome the 
 4 
inherit limitation of verification, Popper offered a concept of verisimilitude, “approximation of 
truth” (Popper 2003, p 234). Verisimilitude suggest that even the most brilliant theories are “at 
best approximations” (Popper 2003, p 234). 
 
Popper’s falsification account too has internal, logical contradictions. While deductive 
logic is knows to be truth-apt due to its form (Hacking 1983), it may contain generalizations 
about reality that cannot possibly be verified. It is logical, as Popper suggests deriving a 
statement of a narrower scope, yet, the original statement remains forever unproven. This logic 
leads to an inevitable conclusion, that in a strict account of deductive logic, no scientific 
knowledge can ever be verified. 
A commonly accepted weak point of falsification is the auxiliary theory argument. Given 
imprecise measurements, techniques, changing subjects etc, it is possible to defend a “falsified” 
theory by either adjusting it or adding a new condition that would void the falsification. This, in 
turn, would cause a theory to grow and become unnecessarily complex.  
Falsification if applied staunchly can cause many progressive theories to be rejected 
before they have an opportunity to flourish. Copernucus model of the solar system contradicted 
the “observations” of his time. Einsten’s theory of general relativity contradicted well established 
laws of physics and based on them common practice observations. By the logic of strict 
falsification, Einstein’s theory should have been rejected. Interestingly, Popper himself was 
known to be Einstein’s intellectual admirer. 
One of the limitations of both Hempel’s verifications and Popper’s falsification theory is 
their over reliance on logic as a fundamental form of reasoning. Work in cognitive psychology 
shows that many processes outside of the logical domain account for much of our thinking, and 
therefore of the endeavor to extend our understanding of reality. A concept of similarity, for 
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example, as one of the basic cognitive processes (Rumelhart and Abrahamson 1973; Imai 1977), 
has seen by cognitive scientists as one of the driving forces behind scientific discovery. 
Similarity judgment is ubiquitous and is closely linked with such cognitive processes as 
classification, concept formation, and generalization (Rumelhart and Abrahamson 1973; Imai 
1977, Tversky 1977). According to cognitive sciences, powerful and sometimes subtle processes 
of analogy, generalization, specialization play significant role in scientific justification 
(Induction 1986, p. 288, p. 326), the concept rejected by logical empiricists. Responding to 
Reichenbach, and indirectly to Popper, psychology argues that the distinction between “context 
of discovery” and “context of justification” is a superficial one, as there is an “intimate 
connection between…how science is done…and how ought to be done” (Induction…1986, p. 
320). Extending the cognitive argument, we see that logic is one of the many tools of scientific 
justification, and therefore, logical contradiction of, for example problem of induction, while 
valid within own domain, cannot account for a full complexity of human’s quest to understand 
reality expressed through science. While controversial on its own grounds, cognitive psychology 
went as far as claiming that “analogy is the primary means of theory construction” 
(Induction…1986, p. 326). While this approach itself is limiting, it does point to the integrated 
view of the context of discovery” and “context of justification,” which allows us to see that both 
formal deduction of Popper and induction of Hempel work well only if phenomena can be easily 
observed. Yet, many problems of science deal around abstract, non-observable issues. In 
situations like that, justification often has to come from the context of discovery and use 
analogies, conceptual combinations, and mixture of inductive and deductive reasoning. 
The reliance on logic and probability has been questioned by a number of experiments 
that reveals a disconnect between human actions and logical and probabilistic norms. 
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Representativeness, common group of “systematic errors” in human cognition (Tversky and 
Kahneman 1974), reflects the probably of one concept belonging to another, broader concept. 
Representativeness has a number of judgment biases that pose a challenge to the logical account 
of scientific justification. “Insensitivity to prior probabilities of outcome” describes an error 
when prior given or known probabilities are ignored. A description that is stereotypical of a 
lawyer will most likely be labeled as the description of a lawyer, even when respondents are 
aware that the number of lawyers is very small in the given sample (Tversky and Kahneman 
1974, p. 1125). “Insensitivity to sample size” reveals the failure to consider sample size in 
predicting outcomes. It is based on the mistaken belief that “chance is … a self-correcting 
process in which a deviation in one direction induces a deviation in the opposite direction to 
restore equilibrium” (Tversky and Kahneman 1974, p. 1125). In reality deviations are diluted 
through large sample size. “Insensitivity to predictability” demonstrates tendency to see future 
similar to the present situation, even though the later may present few clues to the future events 
(Tversky and Kahneman 1974, p 1126). People select outcomes that are more similar to the 
inputs. The more consistent the inputs, the more confident people are of the outcomes. Yet, 
statistically, redundancy among inputs decreases accuracy. These inherit biases proliferate into 
our regular and scientific thinking, and often compete with inductive and deductive forms of 
logical reasoning. 
Scientific justification and important concept for understanding scientific method and 
creating prescription for scientific progress has been approached by both traditional verification 
and falsification accounts as a logical program. Within the logical framework, Popper and 
Hempel provided contrasting account of scientific reason. While each found sound 
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contradictions of opposite theories, they failed to capture the full complexity of a scientific 
process which comes from broadening the perspective on the concept of scientific justification. 
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